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6 November 1957

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# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIA review(s)  
completed.



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1. COMMUNIST OFFICIALS CLAIM KHRUSHCHEV'S POSITION WEAKENED

25X1A Comment on:

[redacted] [redacted] Khru-  
shchev's political future is in jeopardy.  
since the dismissal of Zhukov.

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These opinions contrast with the confidence expressed by Soviet officials on similar occasions in the past that changes in the Soviet hierarchy have strengthened the regime. The views on the Zhukov ouster, probably intended to reach Western governments, may be designed to convey the idea that it is in the interest of the West to refrain from any actions which could help a Stalinist faction to oust Khrushchev.

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Zhukov had been Khrushchev's strongest supporter and that his removal had left Khrushchev dangerously isolated. [redacted]

[redacted] Khrushchev would be the next Soviet leader to fall, probably within the next few months.

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[redacted] Zhukov's support of Khrushchev against Beria in 1953, again in December 1956 during the Hungarian crisis, and also during the June 1957 shake-up of the presidium.

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[redacted] Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Suslov--none [redacted]  
[redacted] considered firm supporters of Khrushchev--may have cooperated to induce him to oust Zhukov. [redacted]

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[redacted] Bulganin has always considered Zhukov a personal opponent.

Yugoslav Communists have contended for some time that Stalinist elements, whom they seem to fear more than Khrushchev, continue to threaten his position and policies. Gomulka may now subscribe to this belief. [redacted]

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

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### 3. TURKISH-SYRIAN BORDER SITUATION

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Comment on:

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Reports received in late October that Turkish troops were being withdrawn from the border area have not been confirmed. The Turks recently prohibited entry into the area near Diyarbakir--a city about 65 miles north of the border and site of a major Turkish air force base--and refused to allow the American air attaché to enter without the approval of the minister of the interior.

Meanwhile, the Syrian radio and press continue to allege that Turkish and unidentified planes are overflying Syrian territory. On 4 November, Radio Moscow charged that "hundreds" of Turkish tanks are moving toward the Syrian border and warned that danger still threatens Syria.

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5. FRAGILE COALITION HANDICAPS NEW FRENCH PREMIER

Comment on:

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[Redacted]

Premier Gaillard's ability to take effective action on France's pressing problems will be limited because his cabinet includes exponents of the widely divergent

views of all the nonextremist parties in the assembly. Even though the assembly gave him a substantial vote, interparty frictions are expected to re-emerge quickly on a number of issues. Gaillard has already moved to make the parties recognize their responsibility, however, by threatening to resign if any of them bolt his coalition.

The immediate problem is to check France's inflationary trend and to halt the drain on the country's internal resources and foreign exchange. Gaillard did not present a detailed program, but intends to demand special economic powers. He may start by imposing stringent import restrictions since he believes France's unfavorable balance of payments is the nub of its economic crisis. He apparently intends to seek new taxation and drastic cuts in government spending to buttress the government's request for foreign aid.

New taxes and budget cuts will be the critical issues, because the Independents oppose additional taxation, and the Socialists will be reluctant to go along with any curtailment of social welfare measures. Current French prosperity, moreover, has tended to hide the seriousness of the financial crisis and the necessity of sacrifices from the French public.

Gaillard is expected to continue the Algerian policy advocated by his two immediate predecessors. Reappointment of Robert Lacoste as minister for Algeria was probably an attempt to assuage fears of rightist deputies who now may be willing to accept the basic statute for Algeria, but there is growing Socialist rank-and-file opposition to its limited scope.

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## 6. PERU SUSPENDS CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN TWO PROVINCES

25X1A Comment on:



Peru suspended constitutional guarantees in two provinces on 5 November because of a clash between workers and the armed forces at Ilo, the southern port being built as an outlet for the new \$200,000,000 American-owned copper industry at Toquepala. Serious unrest in the Ilo-Toquepala area began with a strike declared on 23 October to support demands that the company return a fired workman to his job and dismiss all the high executives of the company. The government on 25 October had declared the strike illegal and sent a destroyer escort and troops with tear gas to the area to support its decision.

Labor troubles in Peru have increased markedly over the past 18 months. Current strikes at northern sugar plantations and on the Central Railway may have strengthened the government's determination to reassert its authority, weakened by labor's successful demand of 18 October for rescission of a decree limiting the freedom of labor organization.

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